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COMMENTS
The Right of Appeal From Trinidad and
Tobago's Industrial Court
R. M. CASTAGNE*
The belief that common law rules and principles are ill-suited to
the task of regulating union-management disputes gained acceptance
as industrialization and industrial relations developed over the years.'
In Trinidad and Tobago, this belief finds expression in the fact that
labor disputes are subject to statutory regulations and are resolved by
an Industrial Court-composed largely of persons with industrial rela-
tions expertise-which is expected to act with regard for the principles
and practices of industrial relations. There is, however, a right of
appeal to the regular, common law-oriented Court of Appeal; there-
fore, the extent to which the Industrial Court's non-common law deci-
sions are challengeable on common law grounds depends largely on
the extent of the right of appeal. To date, the Court of Appeal has
not determined the extent of this right under the controlling statute,
the Industrial Relations Act (IRA) .2
The objective of this paper is to determine the scope of this right
of appeal. By necessity, the discussion relies heavily on decisions of
the Court of Appeal taken under the IRA's predecessor, the Industrial
Stabilization Act (ISA) . The performance of the Court of Appeal
under the former legislation provides an indication of its probable
approach to the current provisions. The IRA provisions, however, are
not identical to those in the ISA, and the extent to which the right
of appeal has been altered will have to be considered.
I. THE IRA APPEAL PRovisIONs
The extent of the right of appeal from the Industrial Court to
the Court of Appeal granted by the IRA is somewhat confusing. On
the one hand, s. 10(3) provides as follows:
* Lecturer in Law, Faculty of Law, University of the West Indies, Cave Hill,
Barbados; LL.B., U.W.I.; LL.M., Osgoode Hall.
1. See generally Weiler, The 'Slippery Slope' of Judicial Intervention, 9
OScOODE HALL L. J. 1 (1971) (Canadian labor law).
2. Act No. 23 of 1972.
3. Act No. 8 of 1965, as amended by Act No. 11 of 1967, repealed by Act
No. 23 of 1972.
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Notwithstanding anything in this Act or in any rule of law to the
contrary, the Court in the exercise of its powers shall-
(a) make such order or award in relation to a dispute before
it as it considers fair and just, having regard to the in-
terests of the persons immediately concerned and the
community as a whole;
(b) act in accordance with equity, good conscience and the
substantial merits of the case before it, having regard for
the principles and practices of good industrial relations.
(emphasis added)
On the other hand, the Court's extremely wide discretion is limited by
subsection (2) of s. 18, which states, inter alia:
Subject to this Act, any party to a matter before the Court shall
be entitled as of right to appeal to the Court of Appeal on any of
the following grounds but no others-
(b) that the Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in the matter;
(d) that any finding or decision of the Court in any matter
is erroneous in point of law; or
(e) that some other specific illegality, not hereinbefore men-
tioned, and substantially affecting the merits of the mat-
ter, has been committed in the course of the proceedings.
(emphasis added)
This section, therefore, apparently retains the right of appeal on just
about any point of law. In addition, s. 18(1) provides that subject
to subsection (2), the proceedings and decisions of the Industrial
Court are not to be ". . . challenged, appealed against, reviewed,
quashed or called in question in any court on any account whatever."
Obviously, how s. 18 is to operate in light of s. 10(3) is not at all clear,
given the evident conflict between the two sections.
Although a right of appeal usually lies from a superior court to
a court of appeal,4 no such right exists unless conferred by statute.5
If only a limited right of appeal is granted, the extent of the right can
only be determined from the interpretation of the relevant provisions
in the statute." Hence, the extent of appeal provided for by the IRA
4. See, e.g., The Judicature Ordinance, T. & T. REV. ORDINANCEs ch. 3,
No. 1, s. 32 (1950).
5. H. W. WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 53-54 (3d ed. 1971); S. A. DE
SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTnoN 23 (3d ed. 1973).
6. The right of appeal must be distinguished from that of judicial review.
Review is based on the legality of the administrative proceedings. In the case
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would have to be determined from the interpretation of s. 18(2),
which is to operate "subject" to the Act and thus, must be considered
in light of s. 10(3) and s. 18(1).
There are two possible interpretations of such an analysis. The
most obvious interpretation is that the exercise by the Industrial Court
of its power under s. 10(3) is subject to the right of appeal on one
of the grounds stated in s. 18(2). This raises two fairly obvious
difficulties, however. First, this interpretation is contrary to the actual
wording of s. 10(3) that the Court is to exercise its power notwith-
standing anything in the Act or in any other rule of law to the con-
trary. No caveat or limitation of any sort is contained in this phrase.
Conversely, the right of appeal granted by s. 18(2) is made subject
to the Act and is, therefore, subject to s. 10(3). Second, the stated
grounds for appeal apparently allow appeal on any point of law. Hence,
to allow an appeal on any of the grounds of s. 18(2) would be to
make s. 10(3) subject to s. 18(2) and thus, to existing rules of law,
a contrary position to that indicated by the wording of those provi-
sions. In addition, s. 18(1) would be virtually ineffective and would
only preclude an appeal to the High Court, an avenue which is already
prohibited by virtue of the Industrial Court's equal status as a superior
court of record.7
The only possible interpretation is to regard the right of appeal
tinder s. 18(2) as subject to the Industrial Court's powers under
s. 10(3). Subparagraph (a) requires that the Court pay regard, inter
alia, to the "interests" of the parties. Presumably, this term includes
legal interests. However, subparagraphs (a) and (b) together require
the Court to reach a "fair and just" decision and to act in accord-
ance with "equity [and] good conscience" and the principles and
of administrative tribunals, application may, unless prohibited by statute, be
made to a higher judicial authority to the effect that the tribunal has exceeded
its jurisdiction (i.e., acted ultrq vires) or committed an error of law on the
fact of the record or that some other specific illegality has been committed in
the course of the proceedings. The right exists quite apart from any right of
appeal which may also be prescribed by the enabling statute. In other words,
the right to judicial review exists unless taken away by statute; the right to
appeal does not exist unless granted by statute. Wade, supra note 5, at 23-24, 54.
7. It could also be argued that s. 10(3) is purely procedural. The wording
of the sub-section, however, tends to defeat this proposition. It is specifically
stated that the Court's exercise of its powers shall be on certain bases, notwith-
standing any other rule of law. It is a mandatory provision. Also, s. 10 as a
whole concerns powers granted to the Court and is, therefore, more than merely
procedural.
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practices of industrial relations. Therefore, if leaving the legal inter-
ests of the parties unaffected would result in a decision which the
Industrial Court considered unfair and unjust, or contrary to the prin-
ciples of industrial relations," then s. 10(3) would seem to require that
the Court override the legal interests in order to render a suitable
decision. That decision, by virtue of s. 18(1), could not be challenged
in any court. In any case, such a decision would be based on the
Court's own interpretation of justice, fairness, or good industrial rela-
tions practice and would, therefore, not be the result of any error of
law as such.
A right of appeal under s. 18(2) would apparently lie in cases
where the Industrial Court reached a decision based upon a wrongful
application of a point of law," or on the basis of some legal misunder-
standing or illegality impugnable on one of the specified grounds.
The right of appeal would probably also be available if the Court dis-
regarded the legal interests of the parties, overlooked a legal rule that
may have influenced its decision, or exceeded its jurisdiction to such an
extent that it acted outside of the scope of the IRA provisions. In
any event, the right of appeal is apparently severely limited, as it
would be possible for the Industrial Court to avert an appeal by
stipulating that, despite the legal issues involved, it reached its deci-
sion on the basis of the principles of s. 10(3), thus overriding the legal
interests of the parties." On the other hand, the Court of Appeal
may well take the view that the legal interests or rights of the parties
are, in the public interest, inviolate. To allow legal rights to be eroded,
for whatever reason, may lead to the erosion of other legal rights,
and a legal system based on the rule of law would be generally under-
mined. Hence, the Court of Appeal may well always be capable of
upholding legal rights on the basis that some error of law was made.
8. E.g., the strict rights of the parties under contract and property law may
conflict with the public interest in having the dispute settled in accordance with
generally accepted industrial relations principles.
9. E.g., wrongful interpretation of a statute as in Kowloon Restaurants Ltd.
v. National Union of Foods, Hotels, Beverages and Allied Workers, 14 W.I.R.
447 (TT. C. A. 1969); British West Indian Airways v. Superintendents Associa-
tion, Civ. App. 8 of 1973 (unreported TT. C. A. 1976).
10. Conceivably, the Court of Appeal could still require the Industrial Court
to show that it considered the legal interests of the parties and could set aside the
award if it had failed to do so. Also, appeals would probably be allowed in cases
where the Industrial Court acted in a manner not provided for in the Act.
Of further interest is the fact that the Trinidad Industrial Relations Act
sections 10(3), 18(1), and 18(2) are identical with the Antigua Industrial Court
Act 1976, Act No. 4 of 1976, sections 10(3), 17(4), and 17(1), respectively.
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II. THE RIGHT OF APPEAL UNDER THE ISA
In the absence of Court of Appeal decisions concerning the ap-
peal provisions of the IRA, reliance must be placed upon the role of
the Court under the previous legislation. The ISA s. 8 provided for
a right of appeal very similar to that of the IRA:
(1) Subject to subsection 2, a judgment order or award of the
[Industrial] Court in any proceedings under this Act-
(a) shall not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed,
quashed or called in question in any Court on any ac-
count whatever; and
(b) shall not be subject to prohibition, mandamus or injunc-
tion in any Court on any account whatever.
(2) Any party to a matter brought before the Court shall be
entitled as of right to appeal to the Court of Appeal-
(b) [O]n a point of law from any judgment, order or award
of the Court. The decision of the Court of Appeal . . .
shall be final.1
Until the Act was amended in 1967, there was no provision
analogous to what is now s. 10(3) of the IRA. S. 13(2) of the
amended ISA stated:
Notwithstanding any other law and, in addition to its powers
under subsection (1), the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction
shall have power-
(a) to make such order or award in relation to a trade dis-
pute before it as it considers fair and just having regard
to the interests of the persons immediately concerned and
the community as a whole;
(b) to act in accordance with equity, good conscience and the
substantial merits of the case before it, having regard to
the principles and practices of good industrial relations.' 2
S. 13(2) was subject to the right of appeal on a point of law accorded
by s. 8(2). The section did not operate "notwithstanding anything
in the Act" as is stipulated in s. 10(3). Thus, any judgment, order,
or award, whether made pursuant to s. 13(2) or not, could be over-
turned on a point of law.
11. Subsections renumbered by Act No. 11 of 1967, s. 5(2).
12. Subparagraphs (A) and (B) were word for word the same as (A) and
(B) of s. 10(3).
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A right of appeal on a point of law is narrower than a general
right of appeal on the merits. 3 Thus, even assuming that a general
right of appeal on any point of law has been retained by s. 18(2) of
the IRA, there must be areas of the Industrial Court's jurisdiction
which are unimpeachable. Presumably, no right of appeal would be
available once the Industrial Court exercised its discretion within its
jurisdiction without infringing any rules of law.
In two cases under the ISA, the Court of Appeal recognized that
the Industrial Court had properly exercised its discretion and disal-
lowed the appeal. In Port Contractors v. Shipping Association," the
appellants objected to being joined as parties to the dispute. The
Industrial Court had decided that, in order to hasten the hearing of
the dispute, it would hear the evidence before making a final ruling
on the issue. The appellants claimed that the Court had no power of
joinder and, even if it did, the exercise of that power would be im-
proper in this case. On appeal, it was held that the Industrial Court
did have the power and was entitled to postpone its ruling. The power
to postpone its ruling was analogous to the ordinary court's power of
adjournment at common law.
Similarly, in Roopchand and Moses v. National Union of Govern-
ment Workers, 5 the Industrial Court allowed a motion by the union
to amend its statement of the case in order to request a payment of
severence money as an alternative to the reinstatement of laid-off
workers. The company appealed, claiming that the dispute, which
was referred to the Industrial Court by the Minister of Labour, con-
cerned the issue of reinstatement only and that the Court had acted
ultra vires in allowing the amendment, as the Court only had the power
to settle the dispute contained in the referral. The Court of Appeal
dismissed the appeal, holding that the essence of the dispute was a
claim that the workers were entitled to some form of relief. The
Appeal Court noted that the Industrial Court was not fettered by the
limitations or rules binding civil courts and that even civil courts may
not refuse to allow an amendment simply because it introduced a new
case.
These two cases seem to suggest that the Industrial Court's
discretion is analogous to that exercisable by ordinary civil courts.
13. de Smith, supra note 5, at 250; Wade, supra note 5, at 53.
14. 21 W.I.R. 505 (TT. C. A. 1972).
15. Civ. App. 87 of 1970 (unreported TT. C. A. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
Roopchand and Moses].
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Roopchand and Moses indicates that s. 8 of the ISA precluded appeals
on questions of fact only,l" not an unreasonable conclusion. Although
s. 8(2) precluded appeal from any "judgment, order or award," s. 8(3)
provided a right of appeal on a point of law in relation to any "judg-
ment, order or award" of the Industrial Court."
This provision, however, did not inhibit the Court of Appeal from
setting aside, in other cases, decisions with which it did not agree.
In such cases, the appellate court would maintain that some error of
law had been committed. In Fernandes (Distillers) Ltd. v. Transport
and Industrial Workers' Union,"s the Industrial Court purported to exer-
cise its powers under s. 13A which stated, inter alia, that the Court
may order the reinstatement, or compensation in lieu of reinstatement,
of a worker who had been dismissed "for reasons which in the opinion
of the Court are harsh or oppressive and unreasonable and unjust."
The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the case was decided
essentially on the facts and was, therefore, unappealable . and noted
that the onus was upon the union to satisfy the Industrial Court that
the order should be made. It strictly construed the section and con-
cluded that the Industrial Court had failed to observe the requirements
of the Act and that it was impossible, upon the findings of the Court,
for it to form the opinion that the dismissal warranted an order of
reinstatement.2 °
16. "By s. 8 of the [ISA] a judgment of the Industrial Court based on a
question of fact shall not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed or called
in question in any Court." Id.
17. In this case, the employers had argued that there was no evidence upon
which the Court could have based its judgment. The Appeal Court held that
although the totality of the evidence was denied by the employers, they were
all questions of fact which could not be challenged on appeal. Compare T.I.W.U.
v. Neal and Massey Industries Ltd., Civ. App. 64 of 1972 (unreported TT. C. A.
1976) (Rees, J. A. dissenting).
18. 13 W.I.R. 336 (TT. C. A. 1968).
19. I cannot agree that the question in dispute between the parties in
this case is merely a question of fact or merely the exercise of a discretion.
One has first to construe s. 13(A), then consider as well the common
law principles as to wrongful dismissal and having arrived at their
meaning determine the facts proved brings [the worker's] case within
them. Id. at 348.
In view of the wording of the section, it is strange that the common law rules
concerning wrongful dismissal would still be considered relevant.
20. In a later and somewhat similar case, Texaco Trinidad, Inc. v. Oilfield
Workers Trade Union, 20 W.I.R. 455, 461 (TT. C. A. 1972) [hereinafter cited
as Texaco Trinidad], counsel for both sides agreed that the principle to be
followed in cases where no error of law appeared on the face of the proceedings
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The above cases strongly suggest that, under the ISA, the Indus-
trial Court's discretion did not extend beyond the determination of
facts and that any decision reached on the basis of the facts was cap-
able of being defeated on a point of law. The right of appeal was
apparently extensive: the two decisions discussed infra seem to sug-
gest that even the Industrial Court's conclusions as to the facts them-
selves, as well as its procedures, were open to question.
Under the ISA, the Court had a wide discretion concerning the
admissibility of evidence. Under s. 11(5) (b), the Court was entitled
to take into consideration such facts it considered relevant "notwith-
standing that such facts would be otherwise inadmissible as evidence."
In Texaco Trinidad Ltd. v. Oilfield Workers Trade Union," a company
worker named Figuero was dismissed and charged with larceny. Upon
being acquitted, he sought reinstatement on the basis that his dis-
missal was harsh and oppressive. The Industrial Court ordered him
reinstated even though aspects of his testimony concerning the alleged
larceny contradicted evidence he had given under oath at his trial.
The appeal was allowed on other grounds,2 but the Court of Appeal
commented:
[T]he [Industrial] Court does not appear to have applied well
known rules of evidence in assessing the value to be placed on
Figuero's testimony. . . . Figuero bad made contradictory state-
ments on oath. In these circumstances to describe his evidence
as merely containing "blemishes and inconsistencies" is to fail to
assess his testimony properly.
23
In T.I.W.U. v. Neal and Massey Industries Ltd.,'4 the Industrial
Court purported to make a decision in favor of the claimant without
the benefit of any oral evidence. (Under s. 9(5), the Court could
require evidence or argument to be presented in writing and decide
matters which were to be heard orally.25 ) The company, which ran
was that articulated by the House of Lords in Edwards v. Bairstow, [1955] 3
All E.R. 48 (A. C. 1954):
Although an appellate tribunal may allow an appeal . . . only if it is
erroneous in law, if it should appear to the appellate court that no
person, if properly instructed in law and acting judicially, could have
reached that particular determination, the court may assume that a
misconception of law has been responsible for the determination.
21. Id.
22. More than six months elapsed before the company reported the dispute.
23. Texaco Trinidad, supra note 20, at 462-63.
24. See note 17 supra.
25. IRA s. 8(5) also allows this.
COMMENT: RIGHT OF APPEAL
a car assembly plant, mad the union had a registered collective agree-
ment which provided for incentive payments to be made to workers
in each production section for work completed in excess of a minimum
quota. Each section was dependent on the other for the ultimate
production of a car, there being one continuous flow from section to
section. The "trim-line" section continuously fell below the production
level of the others, thereby preventing other workers from earning
their incentive payments. To remedy the problem, the company de-
cided to establish a "second" trim-line section, but it then claimed
that both trim-line sections had to complete work on the minimum
quota before incentives could be earned. The union argued that, in
effect, there was but one trim-line section containing additional work-
ers and that all workers were entitled to incentive payments for any
work completed above the minimum quota for one section. The
union based its claim on an interpretation of the collective agreement,
which referred only to one trim-line section.26 The only disputed fact
was whether the union had been given notice of the company's in-
tended action.
At the hearing, the union was asked to begin argument but it
declined to do so, preferring to rely on the industrial agreement and
three documentary exhibits which recounted the presence and the
reasons for establishing the second trim-line section. The company
also declined to lead evidence and made a motion that the union had
not made out its case. The Industrial Court, surprised by these tactics,
asserted that more evidence was needed for it to properly exercise its
functions and threatened to call evidence of its own accord,27 but did
not do so. It reached a decision in favor of the union based on the
accepted facts and its interpretation of the agreement.
26. Art. 26 of the collective agreement stated, inter alia:
Section 1 - Sub Divisions
This incentive plan shall apply to the various categories of workers di-
rectly engaged in production work in the undermentioned sections of
the plant.
(h) trim-line.
Section 3 - Money incentive
When more than eleven (11) vehicles are satisfactorily assembled in
any section during the course of a normal working day, each worker
present for the whole of that working day shall receive an incentive of
$1.10 for each vehicle assembled over and above the minimum quota of
eleven (11) vehicles.
27. IRA s. 8(2) (empowers the Court to do this on its own initiative).
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On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that there was insufficient
evidence to enable the Industrial Court to be properly and correctly
seised of the relevant issues and facts so as to justify a decision in the
union's favor.2 To allow the Industrial Court's order to stand would
have been contrary to "the principles of law, equity and natural jus-
tice." 2 This conclusion was somewhat surprising. Under the circum-
stances, the crux of the dispute was essentially one of interpreta-
tion." Under both the ISA and the IRA, the Industrial Court is not
bound to abide by the common law rules of evidence and, as Justice
Rees suggested in his dissenting judgment, the essential facts of the
case were not in dispute. The fact that the Industrial Court at first
proposed calling its own evidence and then subsequently did not do
so, was not, it is submitted, evidence of a lapse in its duties, but rather
an indication that it eventually considered extra evidence unnecessary
to determine the issue. This case indicates that, for the Court of
Appeal, the Industrial Court's procedures in determining the facts, as
well as its conclusions, 1 were open to question.
The meaning of the phrase "notwithstanding any other law" in
ISA s. 13(2) was never determined by the Court of Appeal, although
Justice Rees made a valiant attempt in his dissenting judgment in
Caribbean Printers." In the earlier Texaco Trinidad case, Justice
28. The Court of Appeal asked searching questions in reaching this decision,
for example:
[Wlas the [Industrial] Court able with the evidence before it to "en-
quire into and investigate" the trade dispute . . . without hearing oral
evidence. . . .Could it ascertain from the evidence before it whether
what was done ...was merely an increase in manpower of the trim-
line section or did it constitute the establishment of a separate and
distinct trim-line section? Was this innovation without any or any
proper consultation with the union? Was the innovation made without
justification and finally did this innovation result in prejudice to the
workers ...?
T.I.W.U. v. Neal and Massey Industries Ltd., Civ. App. 64 of 1972 (unreported
TT. C. A. 1976).
29. id.
30. The question as to whether the union was informed was irrelevant be-
cause of the determination that a collective agreement obtains statutory force
upon registration and, therefore, cannot be altered, even by the parties them-
selves, during the course of its operation. See also Texaco Trinidad, Inc. v.
Oilfield Workers Trade Union, Civ. App. 68 of 1970 (unreported TT. C. A.
1973).
31. See also, the Caribbean Printers case, Civ. App. 30 of 1972 (unreported
TT. C. A. 1975). (Appeal Court held that only common law rules may be used
in interpreting collective agreements).
32. Id.
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Phillips commented that the expression entitled the Court to make an
award notwithstanding the common law rights of the parties. 3  How-
ever, as the above cases have illustrated, this did not preclude a right
of appeal to have those rights respected. The apparently wide discre-
tion granted by ISA s. 13(2) was thus more illusory than real.
An examination of the appeal decisions under the ISA noted above
reveal that the Court of Appeal liberally interpreted the right of
appeal. The two cases in which the appeal was disallowed hinged on
minor points of procedure which were used to hasten the resolution
of the dispute but which did not affect the merits of the case in any
way. It is interesting that in both cases, comparison was made with
lower courts of law from which a general right of appeal lies. In the
cases in which appeal was allowed, the decisions either involved some
"error of law" or the determination of the facts themselves were ques-
tioned on legal grounds. The appeal decisions invariably involved a
thorough review of the facts and circumstances of the case. Thus, the
use of the right of appeal "on a point of law" approximated the use
of a general right of appeal on the merits of the case. 4 This, in effect,
enabled the Court of Appeal to set aside any order or award with
which it did not agree.
1II. THE IRA PRovisioNs-A CHANGE?
The ISA was repealed and replaced by the IRA. Although simi-
lar, the provisions of the present IRA differ in several material respects
from the ISA provisions. First, the phrase "notwithstanding any other
law" in the ISA has become "notwithstanding anything in this Act or in
any rule of law to the contrary." Second, the discretionary use of this
power reflected in the phrase immediately following the one quoted
above-"tbe Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction shall have power"-
has apparently become compulsory in the IRA, i.e., "the Court in the
exercise of its powers shall." 35 Third, the provision that "[a]ny party
... shall be entitled as of right to appeal to the Court of Appeal," has
become: "Subject to this Act, any party to a matter before the Court
33. Texaco Trinidad, supra note 20.
34. But see, R. M. JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 88
(5th ed. 1967):
[T]he Court of Appeal is very wary of questioning the facts as found
by the (lower court) judge, but they may, of course, find that he drew
wrong inferences from the facts or that his application of law to the
facts were incorrect ......
35. ISA s. 13(2); IRA s. 10(3).
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shall be entitled as of right to appeal to the Court of Appeal, on any of
the following grounds, but no others.... .. The right of appeal has,
therefore, apparently been altered.
An indication of how the Court of Appeal is likely to consider
the new provisions may be gained from Transport and Industrial Work-
ers Union v. Public Transport Service Corporation,7 one of the few
judgments rendered thus far involving the IRA provisions. In that
case, the union appealed a decision of the Industrial Court dismissing
a dispute concerning the summary dismissal of a worker. Under s. 10
(6) of the IRA, the Industrial Court's opinion as to whether a worker
has been unfairly dismissed is nonappealable. However, the Court of
Appeal did not dismiss the appeal outright. Nearly seven pages of
the eight-page judgment consist of a review of the facts of the case
and a determination of whether the Court's decision was justifiable.
The fact that the appeal itself was not permissible was not mentioned
until the other objections had been discussed.
Although s. 18(2) was not considered, the Court's extensive re-
view of the case indicated an intention to closely monitor the proceed-
ings of the Industrial Court. The Court of Appeal has thus far always
been able to set aside a decision with which it did not agree. Its ex-
tensive review and evident approval of the Transport Union case on
the merits suggests that there may be little, if any, effective change
in the right of appeal under the present legislation.
Balancing the above view, however, is the dissenting judgment
of Justice Rees in Caribbean Printers,"8 in which he attempted to ra-
tionalize the Industrial Court's authority to act "notwithstanding any
other law" with the right of appeal on point of law. He noted:
[T]he expression "notwithstanding any other law" . .. must be
given a common sense interpretation and . . . can only mean that
in the exercise of its jurisdiction the Industrial Court may by-pass
the common law or any other statute, if necessary, to do what is
fair and just between the parties in the settlement of an industrial
dispute.8 9
Justice Rees added that the Industrial Court's jurisdiction was not
absolute but was restricted by equity, good conscience, and the
36. ISA s. 8; IRA s. 18.
37. Civ. App. 38 of 1973 (unreported TT. C. A. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Transport Union].
38. See note 31 supra.
39. id.
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substantial merits of the case, having regard for the principles of good
industrial relations. In doing so, he attempted to define the nature
of those principles and the Court's duty in regard to their use:
In my view, to act in accordance with equity and good conscience
within the meaning of [the section] is to act in accordance with
what the [Industrial] Court considers right, fair, and just between
man and man. The court is also under an obligation to pay due
regard to the principles and practices of good industrial relations
which have aptly been described as those informal, uncodified
understandings which are ancient habits of dealing adopted by
trade unions and acquiesced in or agreed to by employers. But
this Court comprised as it is wholly of lawyers is in no position to
dispute, but ought rather to accept, the conclusions of a tribunal
composed of persons who are more knowledgeable and experi-
enced in industrial relations. 40
The above dicta is applicable to the present IRA provisions. It would
clearly be against the stated intent of Parliament to interpret the IRA
as providing for a general right of appeal on a point of law. During
the debate on the IRA, it was stated that the Court would be essen-
tially a court of "human relations":
[The Industrial Court .has been accorded] wide and liberal juris-
diction to dispense social justice in accordance with the princi-
ples of equity, good conscicnce, and good industrial relations.
The jurisdiction will be completely divorced from the shackles of
common law and legal technicalities will have no place in its pro-
ceedings. 41
With these principles presumably in mind, the "grounds on which
appeals can now be filled" were "clearly and carefully stated" 42 in
s. 18(2). To hold, therefore, that s. 18(2) retains a right of appeal
on a point of law would limit the Industrial Court within the confines
of the common law riles and restrict it from making any order con-
trary to any rule of law. As noted earlier, this would also contradict
the wording of s. 10(3). It is unfortunate that the right of appeal
was not as clearly stated as Parliament may have believed it to be
stated.
40. Id.
41. Statement of Hon. E.E. Mahabir, Minister of Labour, Trinidad and
Tobago, Debates of the House of Representatives, OFFICIAL REPORT 956-57
(Hansard, June 14, 1972).
42. hI. at 958.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The arguments for and against retaining a right of appeal from
the judgments of labor arbitration tribunals generally, may be sum-
marized as follows:
Appeal to another authority is needed to correct egregious errors,
to prevent undue extension of arbitral power, to integrate the nar-
row expertise of the arbitrators into the general values of the legal
order, and to be a check in the background which reinforces the
arbitrator's own desire to limit himself in these ways. Against this
are first of all, the practical costs (in pursuing appeals). Much
more important though, is the real danger of "absentee manage-
ment." Interpretation and elaboration of collective agreements
usually involves the exercise of judgment about difficult legal is-
sues in which the problem appears. Where one of the decisions
occasionally reaches the Courts, they see only a small part of the
process and perhaps only those cases which present a rather dis-
torted view of the general problem. In the effort to deal with
these concrete instances, in opinions which use general and au-
thoritative language, the necessarily 'uninformed Court can work
great harm on the ongoing process. 43
Given the composition and broad jurisdiction of the Industrial Court,
some right of appeal or review is necessary. The Court has extremely
wide powers affecting the legal interests and rights of persons.
It would not be in the interests of justice-legal, industrial, or other-
wise-to grant a tribunal of two or three persons carte blanche au-
thority to act in a manner it considers fair and in accordance with
equity, good conscience, and good industrial relations practices. Such
a grant would amount to replacing the certainty of fixed and known
legal rules, unsuitable though they may be, with the uncertainty of
each individual judge's own conception of justice and fair play.
Furthermore, the duty to act with "good conscience" is not the same
as the duty to act reasonably. As Justice Scrutton observed: "Some
of the most honest people are the most unreasonable; and some excesses
may be sincerely believed in but yet quite beyond the limits of reason-
ableness." 44
On the other hand, a broad right of appeal is also undesirable.
For example, members of the Court of Appeal are not suited to
43. Weiler, supra note 1, at 64.
44. R. v. Roberts, ex parte Scurr, [1924] K. B. 695, 719, cited in de Smith,
supra note 5, at 304.
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determining labor problems: "[Labour] relations does not exhibit the
degree of consensus, of shared purposes and established principles
which furnishes the premises for the kind of impersonal and objective
reasoning that are necessary for legitimate law-making by appointed
tenured and unresponsive judges. . . ." 4 Also, members of the Court
tend to be taken from, or identify closely with, the middle and upper
classes in the society. Thus, it is questionable whether such a "tenured
and unrepresentative body ...can impartially weigh the competing
interests of union and management and adopt the correct rule."
' 46
This was probably one reason why Parliament did not place the
administration of the Act into the hands of the ordinary courts, but
established a special court not bound by the rules of common law.
Although this carries with it its own shortcomings, the retention of a
right of appeal on a point of law would in effect place the ultimate
control and responsibility of industrial relations into the hands of the
Court of Appeal.
There is no totally satisfactory solution to this dilemma. The only
conclusion is that although a right of appeal ought to be retained,
the role of the Court of Appeal should be severely restricted. Perhaps
it may be possible for legislation to provide for a general right of
appeal to a higher authority within the Industrial Court structure with
severe limitations on a further right to the Court of Appeal. It may
be preferable to do away with a further right of appeal altogether.
Furthermore, it should be possible for criteria to be developed upon
which the Industrial Court would be required to base its decision,47
thus providing a degree of certainty to industrial relations legislation.
45. Weiler, supra note 1, at 4.
46. Id. at 75. "The point is not that the Court would make what in po-
litical parlance would be called anti-labour rules because Courts tend to be
conservative, . . .but ... that the Court will draw from a body of experience
not germane to the problem they will face." Id. at 1 n.1.
47. Such criteria could either be developed by the Industrial Court or, more
preferably, by a joint consultative committee of representatives from labor,
management, and government.
